Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Armchair Analysis
| | RISQ Reviews | 31 January 2005 |
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Author: Sebastiaan van Beek
Should we worry about terrorists attacking us with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)? An assessment.
Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall, citizens of the West have been told that they are threatened by the proliferation of WMDs - chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear - into the hands of terrorists, notably Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Queda network. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened up a Pandora’s Box of possibilities to acquire materials for WMDs or complete WMDs. A number of suitcase bombs and tactical nukes are unaccounted for and could be in the hands of terrorists.
 During the last decennium of the last millennium, this threat became more and more urgent according to opinion leaders and policymakers in the West, pointing at a number of spectacular terrorist attacks during the 1990’s and the first years of the new millennium: The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Sarin Gas Attack on the Japanese Subway in 1995, the Oklahoma City Bombing in the same year, the suicide truck bomb attack on the Kobar Towers in Saudi-Arabia in 1996 and in 1998 two simultaneous attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2000 followed a suicide attack on the USS Cole. Then came the terryfing but in its simplicity brilliant attack on the WTC and the Pentagon on 9/11, followed by the Anthrax letters one month later.
Yet of all these attacks, only two involved means that can be defined as a WMD and neither of these were the responsibility of Al-Queda or its franchises.
The Aum Shinrikyo, or Supreme Truth sect was responsible for the Sarin attack in the Japanese Subway under the guidance of its enlightened leader Chizuo Matsumoto a.k.a. Shoko Asahara. Asahara believed that the enlightenment of the masses had to be achieved by any means available. 11 people were killed.
 The Anthrax incidents in the US were far more sinister. In October 2001 a series of letters reached two US Senators, NBC and the New York Post. The anthrax spores probably infected thousands of people but killed only five. On October 13, Vice-President Dick C linked the letters to Al-Queda. A few months later, however, it became clear that the Anthrax in the letters originated out of an American laboratory. The Anthrax was identified as the virulent Ames strain used by researchers at U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases to challenge newly developed vaccines. Suspect in the Anthrax case is Dr Philip Zack who worked at (USAMRIID). Dr Zack had a prior history of hostility towards Arabs and was caught by a camera entering the weapons storage area without the proper authorization.
Given all the knowledge and all materials that are supposed to be readily available to terrorist organizations, it is remarkable that there have been just two notable terrorist attacks that could be said to have involved WMD. This begs the question as to why there has, in fact, not been any significant terrorist WMD attacks on major population centers in Europe or the United States to date.
The answer to this question is actually quite straightforward. The acquisition of materials for the production of a WMD is not that easy at all, let alone getting your - terrorist - hands on a complete WMD. Indeed the production and deployment of a WMD requires significant knowledge of explosives and electronics along with a sophisticated logistical and financial structure. Then there is the motivation factor; the drive to deliver and use a weapon in a major city on the Northern half of this planet.
Consider the following types of WMD that could be used, and the problems, technical and organizational that these weapons pose for a terrorist organization.
Chemical Agents: Cyanides, Mustard Agents, Nerve Agents, and Toxic Industrial Chemicals.
Cyanides are salts that can be used in there solid state to poison foodstuffs and drinks or could be mixed with chemicals that make penetration of the skin easier. Hydrogen Cyanide and Cyanogen Chloride are liquids that turn into gas at near room temperature. If used in an attack, both forms of cyanide are not likely to result in mass casualties. If used in poisoning food or in conjunction with a chemical agent it will have to be disseminated simultaneously through a large number of targets and in high doses to have any significant result. Either way, placement at a large number of targets at once requires a lot of manpower and makes discovery highly likely. Used in its gaseous form, cyanide needs to be placed in an enclosed space, subway carriage or station, to reach a high enough concentration to be lethal. The smell and physical effects of the agents will probably lead to early detection and ventilation so the amount of victims will not reach shocking numbers. If I were a terrorist, cyanide would therefore not be my weapon of choice. [1]
Likewise, mustard gas and nerve agents such as sarin, tabun or VX, are difficult to produce and hard to keep stable. With the possible exception of mustard gas, nerve agents have to be produced by experts. Delivery poses the same problems as the cyanide gases. Again if I where a terrorist these agents would not be my weapons of choice.[2]
 Toxic industrial chemicals, although not as toxic as the gases mentioned above, can easily be dispersed effectively as they are transported in large quantities through most industrial countries. Given the right weather conditions, an attack on a chlorine or phosgene train close to a large population centre will result in a significant number of casualties and will be very disruptive for day-to-day life. Instead of producing or stealing a weapon of mass destruction, an attack on a train or the hijacking of a truck loaded with toxic chemicals is a very workable option. Indeed such a WMD-by-proxy is a rather tempting weapon.
Biological Agents; Anthrax, Botulinum toxin, Ricin.
Bacillus anthracis, the biological agent of anthrax has the capability to cause massive loss of life over time. However, once detected the disease can be relatively well treated with antibiotics. Turning the bacillus spore into a weapon is very difficult. Only sufficient funding, expertise and technical skills can make anthrax a viable option for a terrorist organization. [3]
Botulinum toxin is produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum. The bacteria occur naturally in soil. The CIA says that they have found references to crude but viable methods for the production of small quantities of this lethal toxin in terrorist training manuals. However, it can only be used in small-scale poisoning attacks and/or aerosol attacks in enclosed spaces such as theaters and conference rooms. Botulinum toxin will not cause mass casualties and so cannot be classified as a WMD. As its use will undoubtedly lead to societal disruption, it would be more appropriate to classify this poison as a 'Weapon of Mass Disruption'. [4]
Ricin is a poison that can be extracted from castor beans. It’s a very potent poison that will inevitably lead to death once it has entered the human body. The only sure way to get the poison into the human body is through foodstuffs that are not heated before consumption such as salads or fruit shakes. To ensure a significant number of casualties, infiltration of a catering company or a fresh food supplier would be the modus operandi of choice. But then again, this is a major operation which requires a lot of manpower and coordination in order to be an effective WMD.
Nuclear and Radiological Devices. [5]
 The first and most destructive of these devices is the Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). Such an IND should produce a nuclear explosion with devastating effect in a metropolitan area. INDs can take three workable forms: (1) An IND constructed out of stolen nuclear weapon components. (2) A modified either stolen or acquired warhead, suitcase nuke, or tactical nuke. Or (3) a do-it-yourself device. Whatever form of nuke is chosen by a terror organization, the acquisition, production, placement and detonation can only be successful if the organization has the logistical and financial structure in place to do so. The planning of an attack requires a large number of individuals. This, in turn, will make discovery over time highly likely.
Apart form INDs there are the so-called Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). Of these there are three kinds:
(1) The passive RDD, which involves the placement of unshielded radioactive material in a busy public space. Placement in a suitcase, in this day and age would be detected very quick and would not lead to many casualties. To be effective a highly radioactive source such as, plutonium or enriched uranium, should be placed in a garbage bin or a plant feature in a station or busy shopping center. The one who places the material will be severely radiated and will surely die of this exposure. Detection is dependent on how soon the symptoms of commuters or shoppers will be recognized as radiation sickness. Plutonium pellets and enriched uranium are hard to require so it is not very likely that these will be used in a passive RDD. A passive RDD is primarily a disruptive weapon because of its localized effects, low casualty rate and high costs of decontamination.
 (2) An explosive RDD or, “dirty bomb”, which is a device that consists of a shielded radioactive source packed in explosives. The explosion itself will kill more individuals than the ensuing radiation. Admittedly, a dirty bomb is a nuisance because of the long-term effects of radioactive contamination after detonation. It kills people and disrupts day-to-day life but it is not a WMD.
(3) An atmospheric RDD, which is probably the most potent of nuclear dispersal devices in terms of contamination. Its aim is to disperse a radioactive source by airflow. Cesium 137 is a good source candidate in this respect; it is a very fine powdered isotope that is used in hospitals and food irradiation facilities. Therefore, it is relatively easy to come by if one wants to acquire it through illegal means. A truck bomb that is constructed to blow a large amount into the air in a busy city center square could irradiate a large number of people and make the surroundings uninhabitable for a long time. Still, its effectiveness depends on the weather conditions at the moment of detonation. High winds or rain will ruin it. Again, then, an atmospheric RDD is a highly disruptive weapon but not a WMD that will result in a high amount of casualties.
If a terror organization like Al-Queda is able to produce or acquire a WMD will it actually use such a weapon?
What I have learned, admittedly in my comfortable armchair, does not make me fear a terror attack with weapons of mass destruction. The organizational and logistical obstacles are such that no terrorist organization to date is able to deploy the current array of WMD even if they would have the capability to do so; the risk of death by WMD through terrorism is negligible. We should worry about other issues than WMD attacks!
References
[1]  Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects, DCI/CIA Special Report, June 2003.
[2] (ibid.) See also: Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare,  Chapter 5: Nerve Agents, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, USA, 1997. (textbook contents)
[3] Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Chapter 22: Anthrax, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, USA, 1997. (textbook contents)
[4] Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects, DCI/CIA Special Report, June 2003. See also: Botulinum Toxin as a Biological Weapon, Working Group on Civilian Biodefense (Consensus Statement), in
Medical and Public Health Management, Vol. 285 No. 8, February 28, 2001.
[5] Information in this paragraph draws on: The Four faces of nuclear terrorism, Chapters 2, 6 & 7, Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), June 2004
Further Readings
“Suitcase Nukes”; A Reassessment. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), September 23, 2002
A Dwarf known as Al Qaeda. By Dirk Laabs, 2 December 2004 (Republished from Los Angeles Times)
Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective. John Parachini, The Washington Quarterly 26:4 pp. 37-50, 2003
CIA Agent Details Nuclear Terror Threat. A 60 minutes special report, November 15, 2004
Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses. Bruce Hoffman. 1997
Published on 31 January 2005 by RISQ
© Sebastiaan van Beek | www.risq.org
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